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Abstract 
Building on a semi-ethnographic study in a Ukrainian prison, the first research of its kind 
in the region, I discuss the normative and governance system of a post-Communist 
prisoner world. I offer empirical support for Skarbek’s theory of prison social order by 
demonstrating how prisoner extralegal governance evolves along with the changing 
structures in and outside the prison to sustain a predictable and tolerable environment 
within a dehumanising and intrinsically volatile context. Nevertheless, prisoner self-
governance, although generally fairly administered, is itself brutal and institutionalises 
inequality. As the history of prison ‘societies’ in the US and UK demonstrates, far-
reaching penal policy changes can radically transform the inner prison world. Such 
changes, widely referred to in Ukraine as the ‘humanisation of the penitentiary system’ and 
‘Europeanisation’, have corroded the power and legitimacy of the traditional model of 
social control. Even so, the inability to resolve many inter-prisoner disputes through 
official channels and the state’s signal failure to meet the demand for protection and 
arbitration proved the utility of the private justice embedded in the inmate code and the 
institution of the illicit adjudicators, thus surpassing their legitimacy deficit and retaining 
the essence of the Soviet underworld. 
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Most prisons function using a conglomerate of formal rules and informal traditions, 
sensibilities, and fiats. This informal normative system, popularly known as the inmate or 
convict code, governs inter-prisoner co-habitation and prisoner relationships with staff. 
Whilst embedded in local material and ideological realities, some version of a prisoner 
culture and self-governance seems to exist in most prisons (Akers et al., 1977; 
Moczydłowski, 1992; Skarbek, 2014). Despite the wealth of accounts of daily life in the 
prisons and concentration camps of the Soviet Gulag (e.g., Solzhenitsyn, 1974; Shumuk, 
1984; Applebaum, 2003),1 the inner world of post-Soviet prisons has met with more 
modest academic attention, particularly in the English language. Important exceptions are 
Piacentini, Pallot, and Slade’s case studies of Russian and Georgian penal institutions, and 
Oleinik’s review of prisons in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, France, and Canada (Oleinik, 
2003, 2006; Pallot and Piacentini, 2012; Piacentini, 2004; Piacentini and Katz, 2017; 
Piacentini and Slade, 2015; Slade, 2016). Building on a semi-ethnographic study, the first 
in the region, I discuss the normative system and extralegal governance of a post-Soviet 
prisoner sociality in Ukraine.2 I find empirical support for Skarbek's (2014) theory of 
prison social order by demonstrating how prisoner normative system evolves along with 
the changing needs and profile of prisoners to sustain a predictable and relatively tolerable 
environment in a dehumanising and inherently volatile place. 
I begin by explaining the salience of extralegal governance as a source of social 
control in prison. I describe the Ukrainian prison system, my methodology, and the 
research site: a medium-security prison for sentenced men. Next, I present my findings of 
an elaborate system of prisoner self-governance and informal law. Finally, I discuss its 
response to structural transformations within and without the prison. I argue that whilst 
prisoners cannot escape this tight informal social control, their changing demographics 
directly affects the legitimacy of extralegal governance. 
 
In inmate code we trust? 
Without governance prisons descend into a Hobbesian state of nature. Legal governance by 
formal authorities faces serious obstacles – from a resource paucity (Gambetta, 1993) to a 
legitimacy deficit (Sparks et al., 1996). Thus, a prominent feature of prisons around the 
globe is their generation of informal normative systems that govern inter-prisoner relations 
and frame prisoner-staff communication. This extralegal governance mitigates prison-
engendered  deprivations, notably the ever-present physical insecurity (Kaminski, 2004; 
Morris and Morris, 1963; Sykes, 1958; Sykes and Messinger, 1960). In his theory of prison 
social order, Skarbek (2014) argues that the underworld institutes extralegal governance to 
ensure sustainability and continuity of its various informal organisations, such as mafia, 
street gang, or a prison collective, by regulating illicit trade, regimenting violence, and 
fostering predictability – if not peace.  
In line with Giddens's (1984) structuration theory, the system of informal norms 
and extralegal governance dialectically adapts to the ever-changing needs and 
characteristics of the people it serves (Skarbek, 2014). Prisoners’ pre-incarceration 
identities and biographies, whether gang involvement or gender or racial persecution, 
social exclusion or drug abuse, alter the existing in-prison structures. This includes the 
informal law of the inmate code, which, like any law, ‘cannot be sequestered from human 
participation’ (Tamanaha, 2004: 123). Scholars have documented the impact of changes in 
penal policies and practices on internal prison dynamics, prisoner profiles, and prison 
cultures. For example, mass incarceration, prison securitisation, racial tensions, and gang 
rivalry in the wider US society have radically changed the ‘traditional’ ‘prison 
communities’ described in early prison ethnographies (e.g., Hunt et al., 1993; Jacobs, 
1974; Simon, 2000; Skarbek, 2014; cf. Clemmer, 1940; Sykes, 1958).3 In the UK, Crewe 
(2009) illustrates how neo-liberal ‘responsibilisation’ policies, along with a surfeit of illicit 
drugs, have individualised British prisoners and transformed the ideology and norms of the 
inmate code (cf. King and Elliott, 1977; Morris and Morris, 1963).  
Despite these and other structural transformations, prisoner extralegal governance 
seems to endure, even if a community responsibility system of gang rule supplants the 
Sykesian reputation-based prisoner self-governance (Skarbek, 2014). The protective 
function of extralegal governance, i.e. provision of some security (Gambetta, 1993), can 
explain this endurance. People in situ and social commentators alike readily recognise the 
need to create a liveable environment in harsh and often volatile world of prisons (inter 
alia, Crewe, 2009; Kaminski, 2004; Ricciardelli, 2014; Skarbek, 2014; Winfree et al., 
2002). This stabilising property of extralegal governance explains why, despite its 
purported opposition to officialdom, administrations tolerate it – if not rely on it – although 
the surge of belligerent gangs in some prisons has eroded staff’s tacit accommodation (see 
Birkbeck, 2011; Cloward, 1960; Darke and Garces, 2017; Irwin and Cressey, 1962; 
Moczydłowski, 1992; Narag and Jones, 2017; Sparks et al., 1996; Sykes, 1958; 
Symkovych, 2017c; Trammell, 2009).  
Whereas early prison scholars emphasised the anti-social nature of the inmate code, 
commentators now agree that many prisoner norms correspond with those in wider society. 
However, their interpretation or enactment may take hyperbolic, even grotesque, forms. In 
men’s prisons (hereafter prisons), the inmate code encapsulates a patriarchal masculine 
ideal and stratification (Newton, 1994). The most common features across individual 
prisons and international jurisdictions include the prohibition of too close association with 
prison staff and informing or any other gross infringement of fellow prisoners’ welfare. 
Prison socialities expect men to maintain a degree of personal hygiene and emotional 
composure in a physically, socially, and emotionally compressed environment (Crewe, 
2009; Kaminski, 2004; Moczydłowski, 1992; Ricciardelli, 2014; Sykes, 1958).4 The code 
commonly stratifies men according to a masculine hierarchy, relegating to the bottom 
those whom prisoner socialities consider not ‘manly’: gay men, prisoners who have 
committed sex crimes against children or men who fail to cope stoically with the harshness 
of imprisonment and brutality of other prisoners (Booyens and Bezuidenhout, 2014; 
Crewe, 2009; Einat and Einat, 2000; Kaminski, 2004; Morris and Morris, 1963; 
Ricciardelli, 2014; Sparks et al., 1996; Sykes and Messinger, 1960; Winfree et al., 2002).  
Despite their omnipresence, the power of prisoner organisations and prisoners’ 
normative commitment to them vary enormously. In some institutions, prisoners co-opt 
into the privileged underworld, its norms and argot (Kaminski, 2004), but elsewhere 
membership is inescapable and prisoners strive to attain and maintain status within it 
(Symkovych, 2017c). Although the inmate code furnishes prisoners with an ideal, the 
extent of their normative commitment and behavioural adherence ranges from 
opportunistic interpretation and frivolous observance, to lip service, to wholesale 
internalisation, rigid enactment, and identity construction and performance round it 
(Crewe, 2009; Kaminski, 2004; Symkovych, 2017b; Trammell, 2009; Winfree et al., 
2002). 
In sum, prisoner systems of extralegal governance maintain a degree of order and 
‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1984) in settings that ‘seethe and boil with human agency, 
passion, and conflict’ (Sparks et al., 1996: 68). Local peculiarities notwithstanding, 
prisoner extralegal normative systems share similarities across borders. They enshrine 
patriarchal hierarchies, censure subordinate masculinities, and promote traditional 
masculine ideals and expectations. Concurrently, prisoner socialities and their models of 
extralegal governance are always in flux, responding to structural changes within prison 
walls – but outside them too. Ukrainian prisons offer an ideal location to test these 
arguments, given the extensive socio-legal, organisational, and ideological transformations 
accompanying the demise of Soviet communism, at a time when equally momentous 
changes have altered the focus and access of prison sociologists elsewhere (Simon, 2000).  
 
Ukrainian prison system 
Like Ukrainian society, the Ukrainian criminal justice system has undergone major 
transformations since Ukraine’s restoration of independence in 1991. Ukraine has ratified 
most international human rights instruments (including prohibition of the death penalty and 
torture) and liberalised prison regimes. The prison population has decreased threefold over 
the last 15 years, with the prison rate standing at 167 prisoners per 100,000 population, 
compared to neighbouring Poland’s 193, Russia’s 424 and Ukraine’s own 2000 figure of 
443 (Institute for Criminal Policy Research, 2017).  
Nevertheless, the actual implementation of ‘Europeanisation’ rhetoric and human 
rights policies has been patchy and troublesome. The Ukrainian Penitentiary Service 
(UkrPS), whilst part of the Ministry of Justice, continues as a militarised organisation and 
has retained the ethos and ranks of law enforcement. Various national and international 
monitoring bodies, such as the UN Sub-committee against Torture (CAT), regularly 
inspect Ukrainian prisons, and prisoners have rights to lodge grievances and law suits; 
even so, allegations of ill-treatment and torture are not unusual  (CAT, 2014; European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment [CPT], 2017).  
Ukrainians report the highest level of corruption in Europe (Transparency 
International, 2017) so it follows that most Ukrainian prisoners have underprivileged 
backgrounds. More than half the country’s 60,000 prisoners are convicted of property 
crimes; 10,300 of murder, 4,700 of grave bodily assault, and 1,400 of rape (UkrPS, 2016). 
The majority were not in employment or education at the time of arrest; half had served 
prior custodial sentences (Prison Portal of Donetsk Memorial, 2010). Ukraine has been 
unwilling, possibly unable, to invest in the refurbishment of its vast and dilapidated prison 
complexes and their overworked staff; general understaffing comprises 14%. The 
monitoring bodies urge the Ukrainian government to increase the prisoner/staff ratio, 
tackle localised overcrowding, and properly investigate and prosecute cases of torture, 
suspicious deaths in custody, and maltreatment (CAT, 2014; CPT, 2017). 
 
The case study 
The data come from a five-month case study in a medium-security prison for sentenced 
men in the Kyiv region. During the fieldwork in this ‘model’ prison I lodged with officers 
from across Ukraine who temporary studied and lived in the nearby UkrPS Training 
Academy. My housing situation allowed me to discuss my emerging findings with officers 
from other Ukrainian prisons with different security levels, housing different ages and 
gender, and with different degrees of prisoner underworld power, i.e., ‘red’ and ‘black’ 
zones. 
The prison’s population of 800 resembled that in other similar category Ukrainian 
prisons. Two thirds were between 20 and 40 years old and the majority were recidivists, 
imprisoned mostly for property crimes, although about 100 were convicted drug offenders 
and 50 were murderers. There were several prisoners convicted of rape and a few of other 
crimes. Like other Ukrainian prisons, this one was severely understaffed, with 20-30 
officers (about 10-15 at night), all men, on duty inside the secure compound. Prisoners 
comprised squads of 50; each squad had its own dormitory and worked in the same 
workshop, thus ensuring tight mutual surveillance (see Pallot and Piacentini, 2012 and 
Piacentini and Slade, 2015 on enhanced panopticism, carceral collectivism, and 
polyopticon).  
The semi-ethnographic fieldwork comprised observations and conversations with 
prisoners and officers, including senior managers, during almost daily visits. Initially, I had 
to accompany an officer in the secure compound, but when anxiety about my presence 
subsided and I managed to establish my credibility and a measure of trust, I spent 
considerable time ‘hanging around’ unsupervised. I spent days (sometimes nights) just 
chatting or drinking coffee with prisoners and officers in all parts of the prison, as well as 
observing and listening to prison life whilst waiting for an available officer with keys 
(sometimes for hours) to let me into another sector or to walk me out of the secure 
compound.  
I tried to speak to everyone whilst avoiding spending too much time with any 
particular prisoner (or prisoner caste) or officer (or staff rank) and resisted being drawn 
into prison power relations (Liebling, 2014; Sparks et al., 1996). Prisoners and officers 
alike found my constant and ubiquitous presence and unabated interest amusing, not least 
because outsiders (chiefly, volunteers and inspectors) rarely spend more than a day within 
the secure compound, far less mingling and casually conversing with prisoners and officers 
about their lives and routines. I believe my handling of various informal tests (see 
Moczydłowski, 1992) and my resolution of ethical dilemmas, together with my 
authenticity and obvious independence from Ukrainian authorities (who refused my entry 
for two years), helped me to overcome the initial wariness and be accepted. Eventually, I 
spoke with all the officers and with about a third of the prisoners.  
To supplement data collected through observation and informal conversations, I 
selected 21 members of staff and 20 prisoners for long, semi-structured interviews. With 
this sample, I aimed to capture and represent the diversity of ages, prison experiences, 
statuses and reputations in both the informal prisoner and formal staff hierarchies. In 
addition, I interviewed at length five officers (three men and two women) in the Training 
Academy. I spoke with hundreds of officers from dozens of Ukrainian prisons during my 
five months, often spending entire evenings discussing the situation and officers’ 
experiences in their respective institutions.  
A content analysis of observation and post-conversation notes and interview 
recordings supplied myriad themes, but here, I discuss only those related to the prisoner 
extralegal normative and governance system. Whilst a case-study design precludes 
generalization, the triangulation and theme saturation achieved suggest the general 
contours of the informal governance apply, institutional peculiarities notwithstanding, to 
other men’s prisons in Ukraine. 
 
Power and flexibility of the Ukrainian inmate code  
Inter-prisoner relations in this, and arguably all Ukrainian prisons, were embedded in the 
unofficial statuses of prisoners and the traditional normative system, known in post-Soviet 
countries as ponyátiya in Russian (Oleinik, 2003) or ponyáttya in Ukrainian (see 
Kaminski, 2004; Antillano, 2017; Weegels, 2017 on grypsing, la rutina, and la ley in 
Polish, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan prisons respectively). This system of statuses, 
traditions, precepts, and strict rules applied to all prisoners as well as to persistent 
(‘professional’) offenders on the outside (a so-called blatnóy or vorovskóy mir, ‘thieves’ 
world’). In accord with the extant literature, these informal norms maintained a measure of 
order and curbed conflicts whilst cementing inequality institutionalised in the status 
stratification.  
As in other prison systems, the Ukrainian underworld I observed constituted a 
hierarchy with ‘unmanly’ men at the bottom (opúshcheni, outcasts) and those vehemently 
professing their allegiance to the inmate code and opposition to the authorities at the top 
(blatní, criminal elite) (Kaminski, 2004; Moczydłowski, 1992; Oleinik, 2003; Trammell, 
2009). The majority fell into the middle category of muzhykí (lads), prudently balancing 
the formal authorities and the demands of the inmate code and masculine expectations 
(Crewe, 2009; Morris and Morris, 1963). Approximately a tenth of the prisoners openly 
assisted the administration in running the prison (kozlý, collaborators). As I discuss 
elsewhere (Symkovych, 2017c), prisoners could not opt out of the underworld power 
structure, although it was their decision which caste to join – subject to meeting the 
requirements and approval from the gatekeepers (the outcasts constituted a punishment 
caste rather than an aspirational group). As in other prisoner ‘societies’, a serious failure to 
meet the masculine and status expectations or a grave violation of the informal law resulted 
in a status downgrade (Kaminski, 2004; Moczydłowski, 1992; Sykes, 1958). Minor rule 
violations usually entailed punishment through beating (Symkovych, 2017b). 
 
Utility and legitimacy of extralegal governance 
Although prisoner allegiance to the inmate code varied markedly, most recognised that 
without extralegal governance and its normative system, chaos and violence would 
consume the prison, making life dangerous and unpredictable. In line with the extant 
literature, these prisoners, like staff, desired predictable, acceptable, and durable order 
(Morris and Morris, 1963; Skarbek, 2014; Sparks et al., 1996; Symkovych, 2017a; 
Trammell, 2009). Although the inmate code entrenched and legitimised discrimination 
through status stratification, it also brought a measure of peace to a place where conflicts 
were inevitable and the population did not hold official laws in high regard: 
 
I wouldn’t say I live in accordance with the ponyáttya. Rather, I follow some 
principle of co-existence. We’re all humans and there are some rules, not exactly 
rules, but models of appropriate behaviour. If we don’t follow them, we would 
degrade to the state of animals, and it would spark a hell lot of conflicts. (Prisoner) 
 
Even though official rhetoric presented the prisoner self-governance system (‘criminal 
traditions’ in UkrPS parlance) as an obstacle to prisoner ‘re-socialisation’ and ‘correction’ 
and a threat to internal order, the inmate code and private justice proved central to the 
generation of prison order (see Nunes Dias and Salla, 2013; Skarbek, 2014; Trammell, 
2009). Furthermore, the norms of the prisoner community generally corresponded to the 
values of wider Ukrainian society (see Clemmer, 1940). Accepted principles included, 
inter alia: a requirement to justify personal words and deeds, a prohibition of informing 
on, or stealing from, fellow prisoners, respect for mothers (but not women in general), and 
an adherence to informal rules and hierarchy (see Crewe, 2009; Kaminski, 2003; 
Moczydłowski, 1992; Oleinik, 2003; Sykes and Messinger, 1960). A traditional prison 
attitude of ‘mind your own business’ (Sykes, 1958) exemplified a respect for individuality 
– something that the official prison structure, including ‘degradation ceremonies’ 
(Garfinkel, 1956), undermined (see Sparks et al., 1996). The inmate code, as in other 
jurisdictions, was intended to sustain peace, group cohesiveness, and guard its boundaries 
by maintaining the symbolic ‘us and them’ line between prisoners and authorities. 
The power and legitimacy of the inmate code derived from its perceived 
reasonableness and universal and fair enforcement thus reducing the ‘unpleasant state of 
uncertainty’ (Tamanaha, 2004). Tamanaha (2004) argues, persuasively, that the rule of law 
comprises, inter alia, generality (universality together with constraints on the rulers) and 
predictability (that accommodates flexibility), whereas the law’s content, application, and 
consequences withstand moral scrutiny whilst serving the public good. This contrasted 
with the unfairness, arbitrariness, and unreasonableness of many official prison rules and 
formal laws in Ukraine in general (Symkovych, 2017a). Although official prison rules and 
practices were intended to provide the framework for maintaining order and ‘re-
socialising’ prisoners, their content and application often undermined prisoners’ agency 
and dignity, causing the prisoners to question their legitimacy and defy or resist them:  
 Why must cons have a name tag (bírka)? […] Why must we do morning exercises? 
For health reasons? In this case, I bet not a single [prison officer – mládshy 
inspéctor] does it. […] Why must I stand up and greet a [prison officer] when he 
deems me a piece of shit and I don’t have any grounds to respect him? – Have you 
ever seen a [prison officer] raising or greeting a prisoner? [Laughs cynically] 
(Prisoner) 
 
The prisoners I talked to perceived many prison rules as irrelevant or unnecessarily 
oppressive. The juristic concepts of the spirit of law and the moral principles within the 
law prove helpful in elucidating the power and legitimacy of the Ukrainian inmate code 
(see Meyerson, 2007). The spirit of the Prison Bylaws (2014) is maintenance of order and 
security whilst prisoners almost unanimously argued that the cornerstone principle of the 
ponyáttya, i.e. the set of informal principles, rules and mores, was to protect everyone’s 
well-being, order followed as a by-product (see Irwin and Cressey, 1962 and Skarbek, 
2014 on utilitarianism of the ‘convict subculture’ and gang rule respectively). Moreover, 
the prisoners regarded these ponyáttya as principles rather than rigid rules – unlike the 
Prison Bylaws – although some informal precepts, as well as the prisoner structure in 
general, were nothing if not rigid (see Skarbek, 2014). In any case, in the prisoners’ view, 
the formalistic application of rules, i.e. the primacy of the letter of the law over the purpose 
and spirit of the law, gave way to a contextualised interpretation of principles (see 
Kaminski, 2004).  
Furthermore, the smotryáshchi, i.e. illicit guards from the ranks of the criminal 
elite, who were responsible for interpreting and enforcing the informal principles and rules 
and dispensing extralegal justice, possessed a ‘democratic pedigree’ (Sunstein, 1997: 530), 
unlike formal administrators (see Symkovych, 2017c on informal prisoner organisation and 
argot roles in Ukraine). In other words, the prisoners deemed their informal adjudicators to 
be representative and accountable, although this was not always the case (see Narag and 
Jones, 2017; Skarbek, 2014). Unlike official bureaucrats, the informal prison adjudicator 
was not above the (informal) law and could lose his ‘office’ upon compromising his 
credibility (see Tamanaha, 2004 on the ‘rule of law, not man’ and the judge as ‘the law 
personified’). The prisoner universe outlawed and severely punished arbitrariness 
(bespredyél) and its version of unfairness: discriminating against the lower castes was 
‘fair’, as their place in the hierarchy reflected their ‘choice’ and ‘free will’ in failing to 
meet the expected masculine standard (Symkovych, 2017b, 2017c; see Kaminski, 2004 
and Moczydłowski, 1992 on the self-division of Polish prisoners into ‘people’ and 
‘suckers’).  
The literature demonstrates that inter-prisoner violence frequently erupts from 
unresolved conflicts, annoyance, and accumulated frustration, sometimes triggered by 
seemingly trivial disputes or mundane irritants, like loud music or queue-jumping (Crewe, 
2009; Sparks et al., 1996). Indeed, I witnessed a crisis in a medium-security London prison 
when an ounce of prisoner tobacco went missing; resolution required the intervention of 
the prison governor and Independent Monitoring Board. Unlike other jurisdictions, the 
Ukrainian inmate code outlawed theft from fellow prisoners, as well as inter-prisoner 
violence unless sanctioned by informal adjudicators (cf. Crewe, 2009; Einat and Einat, 
2000; Kaminski, 2004). Thus, prisoners had to take all but minute disputes to the criminal 
elite and accept the verdict (see Nunes Dias and Salla, 2013; Skarbek, 2014; Trammell, 
2009). Most acquiesced, as the application of informal rules appeared contextually ‘just’ 
and enjoyed procedural legitimacy (cf. Kaminski, 2004 on experienced grypsmen abusing 
their prison acumen and ‘spinning an affair’ for personal gain). Being unrestricted by 
control and security priorities and the demands of official law, informal prisoner 
adjudicators could get comprehensive and honest testimonies from the parties and 
witnesses involved (see Gambetta, 1993 on the underworld’s often advantageous access to 
information and networks compared to the state institutions). Whereas Ricciardelli (2014) 
reports grotesque prisoner indifference and ignoring inter-prisoner violence and abuse in 
Ontario federal prisons, the Ukrainian inmate code required prisoners to report 
immediately to illicit adjudicators any infringement of informal rules.  
The prison’s inmate code promoted solidarity and engagement, although its 
translation into practice was sometimes problematic (Crewe, 2009; Mathiesen, 1965). 
Being an elaborate normative framework with a kaleidoscope of expectations and ideals, 
rather than merely a set of fiats, only its most unequivocal precepts, such as prohibition of 
theft from fellow prisoners or arbitrary violence, were beyond negotiation and 
discretionary interpretation (see Kaminski, 2004; cf. Einat and Einat, 2000; Skarbek, 2014; 
Sparks et al., 1996). Other dictates rarely entailed strict enforcement (see Tamanaha, 2004 
on the rule of law accommodating a balance between, on the one hand, universality and 
predictability and, on the other hand, discretionary exception, especially in informal 
communitarian settings). For example, while the inmate code prohibited informing, 
supplying information to the administration was not uncommon. First, the caste of 
collaborators de facto possessed a licence to inform the authorities of serious 
transgressions, such as devising contraband schemes, engaging in illicit gambling or 
contemplating suicide because of prohibitive debt. Second, whilst discouraging prisoners 
from close association with officers, especially with the security department, prisoner 
sociality accommodated the need to visit administrative offices. Although prisoners viewed 
such visits with suspicion and whenever possible tried to liaise with the formal authorities 
through prisoner-trustees (collaborators), the prisoner community appreciated that such 
visits had to occur, so parole would succeed (see Symkovych, 2017c).  
Similarly, whilst prisoners had little option but to acquiesce, their normative 
commitment varied signally (see Trammell, 2009 on prisoner acceptance versus approval 
of racial segregation in California prisons). For example, some inmates argued ardently 
that prisoners should not remain disengaged and individualistic like ‘passengers on a 
train’; they should care for the welfare of other prisoners and facilitate the rule of informal 
law, including relating transgressions to the criminal elite. Conversely, whilst the prisoners 
who staunchly adhered to the ideology and precepts of the inmate code denounced 
transgressors because of their moral convictions, others did so out of fear. Failure to report 
amounted to complicity and led to a beating and possible demotion in the hierarchy. As I 
discuss elsewhere, the incessant mutual monitoring and self-censorship, amplified by the 
living and working arrangements of carceral collectivism, took an unregistered toll on 
prisoners. None the less, it minimised the impunity that undermines formal law in wider 
Ukrainian society (Symkovych, 2017a) and strengthened the rule of informal law:  
 You know, [on the outside] I used to steal for four years before I was caught. I 
always got away with it. However, here, I stole once and I was black and blue. 
They [prisoners] beat shit out of me. I know here if I steal I’ll be punished for sure, 
and punished severely. (Prisoner-outcast) 
  
All prisoners and officers with whom I spoke concurred that it was almost 
impossible to conceal something in the prison for very long (Kaminski, 2004). Everyone 
seemed quite clear that infractions of prisoner community conventions, if identified, would 
entail harsh punishment (see Gambetta, 1993 and Skarbek, 2014 on the fundamental role 
of reputation and ‘credible threat’ in the underworld’s extralegal governance). In wider 
society, general corruption and the omnipotent arbitrariness and impunity of the state 
apparatus undermines formal law, making it a coercive tool against the disempowered (see 
Symkovych, 2017a). However, in this prison, any deviation from expected conduct was 
penalised regardless of the status of the offender: 
 
You are accountable (otvecháyeshy) for your every word, every step. If you say 
something, you must prove it. – You cannot just come and hit somebody, even an 
outcast, only because you don’t like their face. Any conflict you’ve got, you bring 
it to an illicit guard. If he finds that another con acted in violation of ponyátiya 
[informal rules], only then would that prisoner be punished. (Prisoner-collaborator) 
 
The requirement to substantiate any statement and justify violence removed some 
of the typical tensions and altercations that incite social conflict in prisons (see 
Moczydłowski, 1992 and Kaminski, 2004 on ‘cursing duels’, ‘blasphemy’, and spreading 
rumours, or Crewe, 2009 on ‘calibrated confrontations’). In Ukraine, this extralegal self-
governance, institutionalised through the prisoner hierarchy and inmate code, as with other 
jurisdictions, curtailed excessive violence and reduced the volatility and unpredictability of 
prison life (Moczydłowski, 1992; Nunes Dias and Salla, 2017; Oleinik, 2003; Skarbek, 
2014; Sykes, 1958; Trammell, 2009). The effectiveness of extralegal governance stemmed 
from the perceived legitimacy of informal norms and the certainty of enforcement, 
including through violence. The state may have had a monopoly on the legal use of force, 
but here, prisoner sociality institutionalised violence, if sanctioned by the criminal elite, to 
enforce its principles and rules (see Antillano, 2017; Nunes Dias and Salla, 2017; Skarbek, 
2014; cf. Weber, 1962; Austin, 1995). The extralegal governance model described, like 
any other governance system, entailed a high price. It discriminated against and 
dehumanised some people (‘outcasts’) and normalising regimented violence. Nonetheless, 
supporting Gambetta (1993) and Skarbek (2014), my research participants explained this 
institutionalised moral blindness by maintaining that the service of the informal 
governance system outweighed its costs because it restrained opportunistic and 
uncontrolled predatory behaviour for the benefit of the majority.   
 
The ever-changing code  
Whilst its regulatory and protective functions ensured the continuing dominance of 
prisoner extralegal governance, this prisoner power fixture has been evolving concurrently 
with liberalised penal policies, structural changes in wider society and new geo-political 
realities (see Symkovych, 2017c). Whereas the underworld cultures in Poland, Russia, and 
Ukraine developed similarly due to those countries’ past political integration, my research 
participants claimed that since the disintegration of the Communist bloc, the Soviet 
‘thieves’ world’ had been growing apart and the emerging norms now differ in Ukraine. 
For example, a surge of drug use among prisoners led the prison underworld to introduce a 
new norm prohibiting the involvement of prisoners’ mothers in drug contraband to avoid 
endangering these loyal women. The prisoners claimed that such prohibition existed only 
in Ukraine, although only further research can ascertain whether this is the case, and how 
universal and practical this new rule is even in Ukraine.  
The liberalised penal policies, including the availability of parole and increased 
accountability of staff, have transformed Ukrainian prison cultures with an observable 
effect on daily practices. First, the prisoner normative system now values prudential ‘doing 
time’ with minimal suffering and discomfort over virulent opposition to the administration 
or dramatic martyrdom for the ‘criminal ideal’ of non-alignment and resistance 
(Symkovych, 2017b). Unlike in the 1990s, parole is now real: over the last decade, 15-
30,000 prisoners per annum have been leaving on parole before the expiration of their 
custodial sentences. However, to get early release, prisoners must engage with and show a 
measure of deference to the administration (see Crewe, 2009). Thus, the prisoner sociality 
now de facto accommodates a degree of collaboration, even some judicious informing, 
despite professing non-alliance and opposition to the formal authorities. I noted fairly 
amicable staff-prisoner relationships in this prison and was given to understand this was a 
more recent situation – but not unique to the research prison. (Naturally, I did not observe 
earlier officer-prisoner relations first-hand and had to rely on my research participants to 
explain some of the post-Soviet changes and practices in this and other Ukrainian prisons.) 
Whereas staff-prisoner relationships and power negotiations in any prison often work to 
defy the official opposition, in this particular prison, the improved material conditions, 
liberalised regimes, and increased accountability that curbed officer cruelty seemed to have 
reduced previous animosity. Staff brutality or power inequality have not disappeared, but 
all my research participants said today’s Ukrainian prisons are much less antagonistic and 
vindictive than they were in the 1990s, with an even more striking departure from prisons 
under Communist authoritarianism (see Winfree et al., 2002 on deprivations and negative 
attitudes towards staff).  
Second, the liberalised sentencing has resulted in many old-school criminal elite 
members ‘retiring’ from the elite to simply work their way through their sentences, thus 
leaving young and inexperienced prisoners with relatively short sentences and dubious 
moral standing filling the void (see Symkovych, 2017c). Together with the liberalised 
sentencing and parole regime, an influx of drugs has corroded the legitimacy of the 
criminal elite and, by extension, the system of prisoner self-governance (see Tamanaha, 
2004 on the indivisibility of law and human agents). Many prisoners, as well as staff, 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the new contingent of criminal elite: 
 
You never trust a con. But before at least there was such a thing as ‘a con’s word’ 
(zékivsyke slóvo). – Now they say whatever they want but you cannot trust it. They 
are not masters of their word, as they all are drug-users and alcoholics. Or, 
homeless. (Prison school director) 
 
Those prisoners, even in the lowest informal stratum, who witnessed first-hand the ‘moral 
degradation’ of the criminal elite in action, when their conduct was at odds with the 
criminal precepts they promoted (see Tamanaha, 2004), were quite critical of the whole 
concept of the informal moral and legal norms and questioned the legitimacy of extralegal 
governance. The following vignette highlights the role of human agency in endurance of 
structures (Giddens, 1984): 
 
I do not follow the ponyáttya (informal norms). And those who do – are fools. They 
do not realise that these are not the same ponyáttya as those in the past, [i.e.] the 
ponyáttya in the name of which people suffered. I used to work as a cleaner down 
in the ‘pit’ [segregation block]. In the DPK [a close supervision centre] bread and 
sálo [traditional Ukrainian lard] were getting mouldy. It’s a great sin to let bread 
get mouldy! They [criminal-elite] are so insolent. They are fussy and demand [from 
other prisoners] the best food, better cigarettes. – And they don’t give a fuck that 
muzhykí (lads) out there sometimes give the last pack [of cigarettes]. That’s how 
criminal-elite suffer in the name of the criminal idea! (Prisoner-outcast) 
 
Although the metamorphoses of the prisoner normative and governance system are 
both fundamental and minute, UkrPS administrators are not always aware of its dynamic 
nature. For example, before I started my fieldwork, the Deputy Head of the UkrPS 
instructed me to take off an ear stud I was wearing so prisoners would not presume I was 
gay. She also warned me not to wear anything red, as this colour was taboo in the ‘thieves’ 
world’ for historically it symbolised communism and the unfair, repressive, and inhumane 
state (see Moczydłowski,1992 and Kaminski, 2004 on grypsmen and communism). I 
followed her advice, but eventually prisoners noticed my pierced ear. The ensuing 
discussions revealed that piercing no longer denoted homosexuality, nor did the colour red 
mean allegiance to officialdom. We all had a good laugh, and the prisoners told me that 
this advice would have been helpful about 20 years ago and perhaps in some institutions 
for young offenders (YOIs). Reminiscing about their time in YOIs, my research 
participants told me that in those prisons, extralegal governance entails the more 
fundamentalist, cruel interpretation and enforcement of the inmate code than in prisons for 
adults (see Kaminski, 2004; cf. Winfree et al., 2002 on hard-core recidivists attitudes and 
Irwin and Cressey, 1962 on less pronounced convict cultures in juvenile institutions). 
Additionally, being dynamic within individual prisons, the inmate code has variations and 
nuances across the Ukrainian penal landscape, although extralegal governance retains its 
general parameters.  
Despite the changing profile of the criminal elite and the attendant discontent, the 
prisoners could not imagine life without a traditional hierarchy and institutionalised 
extralegal governance. Regardless of his views, even the prisoner-outcast cited above 
could not afford non-compliance with the informal rules, as every prisoner had a place in 
the hierarchy and had to obey the informal law or face severe punishment (Kaminski, 
2004; cf. Clemmer, 1940 on ‘ungrouped’ prisoners). As many inter-prisoner disputes arise 
from illicit activities and sub-rosa economy, such as gambling, these Ukrainian prisoners 
could not believe that English prisoners do not have the identical position of illicit guard:  
 
Are you joking? So if two prisoners have an argument of some sort, they will go to 
otryádnik (a personal officer) or whatever a member of staff is called over there? 
That’s fucked up! Really, they don’t have illicit guards or vóry (‘thieves’)?! 
(Prisoner-lad) 
 
Thus, even though prisoners decried some of the changes in the prisoner normative system 
and the undermined legitimacy of the criminal elite, they, overall, vouched for the 
functional pertinence of the inmate code, underworld hierarchy, and private justice. Indeed, 
the inherent legitimacy deficit notwithstanding (Sparks et al., 1996), the formal authorities 
lacked the resources, crucially staff, to offer adequate protection and arbitration to offset 
the utility of extralegal  governance (Gambetta, 1993). Nothing suggests that the Ukrainian 
state entertains any plans of radical alteration of its role in prison governance, despite the 
radically decreased prisoner population and official rhetoric (see CPT, 2017). As Skarbek 
(2014) argues, extralegal governance sustains, despite its metamorphoses, as long as a need 
remains for extralegal protection and regulation. In response to cultural, organisational, and 
political transformations in wider society and the new realities in Ukrainian prisons, these 
prisoners have adopted new norms and relaxed or abandoned some of the old traditions 
(see Kaminski, 2004 on the decline of prisoner tattoing in Poland). For example, once a 
prisoner with a family or with military service experience could not become a member of 
the criminal elite.5 However, but now the ‘thieves’ world’ overlooks this prohibition to fill 
the void resulting from new penal policies and the changing demographics of prisoners. 
Nonetheless, whilst undergoing important transformations, the informal prisoner 
organisation with its normative and governance system remain crucial in maximising the 
relatively peaceful co-existence of these Ukrainian prisoners. 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the first of this type research into the Ukrainian prison world, in this article I 
have examined the evolution of the informal normative system that regulates inter-prisoner 
relations and staff-prisoner communication. My findings lend support to Skarbek's (2014) 
theory of prison social order by highlighting the connection between the prisoner system of 
informal law and extralegal governance and structures outside the prison and illustrating its 
role in ameliorating prison-engendered insecurities. The findings confirm the importance 
of the inmate code and prisoner private justice in curtailing excess violence and 
maximising predictable order and acceptable co-habitation, supporting research in other 
jurisdictions. This should not obfuscate that prisoner extralegal governance, although 
generally fairly administered, is itself brutal and institutionalises inequality, by establishing 
a rigid hierarchy.  
The Ukrainian inmate code and its underworld hierarchy manifest many similarities 
with those of the West and beyond, but has some local peculiarities. For example, whilst in 
some jurisdictions, prisoners have to ignore the individual abuse of fellow prisoners, the 
Ukrainian normative imperative required prisoners to report any transgression of the 
informal rules and principles to illicit adjudicators. The spirit of the code expected 
prisoners’ engagement with the prisoner world and the welfare of others despite any 
personal disagreement with it. Even so, these normative expectations were not universally 
internalised, nor did they automatically translate into practice. Prisoner normative 
commitment to and actual enactment of the ideology and rules of the ‘inmate code’ varied 
substantially. Nevertheless, the code’s perceived legitimacy and a ‘credible threat’ of 
punishment (Skarbek, 2014) due to the tight mutual control of the polyopticon (Piacentini 
and Slade, 2015), facilitated the rule of informal law and endurance of this model of 
extralegal governance.  
Changes in Ukrainian penal policies and prison practices, widely referred to as the 
‘humanisation of the penitentiary system’ and ‘Europeanisation’, have corroded the 
traditional power and legitimacy of this model of social control, in this prison and likely 
elsewhere. Structural transformations have altered the profile of the criminal elite and 
decreased antagonism between officers and prisoners, thereby affecting the utility of 
prisoner solidarity and highlighting the value of shrewd opposition to the administration. 
Nevertheless, ongoing corruption and unfairness in the Ukrainian criminal justice system 
lends legitimacy to the prisoner hierarchy and informal law. The prisoners in my study, 
palpable discontent notwithstanding, overall perceived it as fair, reasonable, and practical. 
Furthermore, despite their condemnatory rhetoric, the prison administration benefited from 
these informal structures, as without them order would prove untenable. The inability of 
resolving many inter-prisoner disputes through official channels because of their illicit 
nature and the state’s failure to allocate adequate resources, primarily staff, made private 
justice and extralegal governance functional. This finding coincides strongly with the 
theoretical model of Gambetta (1993) and Skarbek (2014): extralegal governance endures, 
its metamorphoses notwithstanding, as long as the state fails to satisfy adequately the 
people’s (and their markets’) need for protection, regulation, and arbitration.  
As the history of prison ‘societies’ in the US and UK demonstrates, far-reaching 
changes in penal policies can radically transform the inner prison world. Whilst Ukraine is 
not immune to global neo-liberal trends, until now it has not demonstrated much interest in 
either radical sentencing or penal reform. Instead, arguably because of its financial abyss, 
Ukraine has steadily reduced its prison population (along with prison staff) rather than 
importing the ‘law-and-order’ and mass incarceration policies and practices of some 
Western countries, notably the US and UK. Thus, despite its numerous transformations, 
the Ukrainian inmate code and prisoner power system retain the essence of the Soviet 
underworld’s features and continue to provide extralegal governance whilst the state 
signally fails to meet prisoners’ need for protection and arbitration. Even so, as cultures are 
inherently dynamic, the prisoner normative and governance system is destined to continue 
its evolution. Its further development is difficult to envisage, for Ukrainian politics (and 
economy) are nothing if not volatile and unpredictable.  
This case study was limited to a single, ‘model’, ‘red zone’ prison thereby 
precluding bona fide generalisations. Despite the inherent limitations of a case study 
approach, my extended and extraordinary access to officers from across Ukraine and the 
accounts prisoners gave of their experience in other Ukrainian prisons suggest that the 
prisoner organisation I observed and its inmate code exist in all men’s prisons in Ukraine. 
However, the evidence points to its different interpretations and enactments across 
institutions and prisoners whilst retaining the essence and contours of this national model. 
Future research might examine social control in other Ukrainian penal institutions with 
various security categories, housing different populations (men, women, and minors – 
sentenced and on remand), and engendering different power arrangements (‘red’ and 
‘black’ zones). Investigating how human participation (including legitimation) affects the 
content and operation (reproduction) of the extralegal governance system will produce 
important insights for structuration theory and for the sociology of imprisonment in 
general.  
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Notes 
1. Cressey and Krassowski (1957) offer a bibliography in English, mostly Gulag memoirs. 
2. Prisoner extralegal governance operates through the informal law of the inmate code and 
illicit prisoner stratification. In this article I focus on the normative component of prisoner 
self-rule, but in Symkovych (2017c) I examine the role of prisoner informal self-
organisation. 
3. Sykes (1958) documents how his ‘society of captives’ differed markedly from the 1930s 
and 1940s when prisoners ‘ran their own affairs’ before the authorities revamped the 
power arrangements. 
4. Informal rules and conventions tend to be minute when regulating co-habitation in 
compressed settings: e.g. see Kaminski (2004) on ‘dirty physiology’ norms. However, 
official prison rules are also known for their ‘pettiness’ (Sykes, 1958).  
5. Service in the military signified ‘collaboration’ with the state. Akin to the logic of the 
Catholic Church regarding the priests’ celibacy, the underworld maintained that a family 
would ‘undermine’ the criminal elite’s loyalty, devotion, and attention to the prisoner 
world. 
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